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Abstract  
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between 
board attributes and real earnings management of listed Nigerian 
financial institutions. The residuals from Roychowdhury (2006) is 
used to proxy real earnings management. Data were collected from 
45 financial institutions quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(NSE) from 2011 to 2016. For analysis purpose, the Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors (PCSEs) regression was utilized. The regression 
result shows that board meeting and board expertise have a 
significant positive impact on real earnings management. Whereas, 
female directors has a significant negative influence on real earnings 
management. The study recommends that the authorities concerned 
in Nigeria should concentrate on the recent technique of real 
earnings management (cash flow from operation, discretionary 
expenses and cost of goods sold) known to board members in 
developed economies in order to play a pivotal role in constraining 
corporate managers to act opportunistically in the ordinary course of 
business activities and preparing financial reports. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance has become an important agenda for listed companies in any stock exchange 
market globally. The status can be seen through its evolution in several events, including the 1997 East Asia 
crisis and the series of recent corporate scandals in the US and many other countries world over (Becht, 
Bolton, & Rosell, 2002; Roy, 2015). Hence, the need for sound corporate governance becomes a subject of 
debate in recent years. Corporate governance is a process by which firms are managed, controlled and 
regulated (Azubike, 2014). It is targeted at fulfilling responsibilities for the board in the preparation of 
financial reports. In doing so, it increases the expectation that corporate governance may deter or minimise 
both manipulation of accrual based and manipulation of real activities (Hsu & Wen, 2015). Setting a corporate 
board structure could lead to many benefits at different levels of management and indeed helps the 
organisation to maximise earnings; minimise investment risk and enhance the firm’s value (Abubakar, 2013; 
Liu & Tsai, 2015; Zgarni, Halioui, & Zehri, 2014). Interestingly, this highlighted crisis has extended too many 
countries across the globe with unwanted consequences on various economies and stakeholders in particular.  
In Nigeria, the financial sector has witnessed different factors which led to slow pace or distortion of the 
desired level of economic growth and development including poor corporate governance, especially the board 
attributes (Soludo, 2004). Recently, the boards of some insurance companies in Nigeria have been dissolved as 
a result of financial reporting failure which includes earnings management practices and negative claims 
payment reputation (NAICOM, 2015).  
Nevertheless, most of the studies on board attributes and earnings management in Nigeria were 
conducted on the accrual earnings management (Bala & Kumai, 2015; Isenmila & Afensimi, 2012; Kurawa & 
Abdulrahman, 2014; Omoye & Eriki, 2014; Salihi & Kamardin, 2015; Uwuigbe, Peter, & Oyeniyi, 2014) and 
limited studies are manifestly conducted on the real earnings management in non-financial sector (Hassan & 
Ibrahim, 2014).  More so, Bala and Kumai (2015); Kurawa and Abdulrahman (2014); Omoye and Eriki (2014); 
Uwuigbe et al. (2014); Salihi and Kamardin (2015) have specifically conducted studies on non-financial sectors 
in Nigeria using the accruals manipulation without taking real earnings management into consideration, most 
especially in the Nigerian financial institutions. Therefore, the objective of this study is to examine the effects 
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of board attributes on real earnings management of listed Nigerian financial institutions. Thus, this paper is 
divided into following headings; introduction, methodology, result and conclusion.  
 
2. Hypothesis Development and Methodology  
Corporate governance is the method and technique in which the activities of corporation are directed by 
board of directors who discharge the obligations on behalf of the shareholders (Azubike, 2014). Furthermore, 
Kyereboah‐coleman and Biekpe (2006) perceived corporate governance as the relationship of the corporation 
to shareholders, or in the broader sense as a relationship of the corporation to a society as a whole. However, 
Friese, Link, and Mayer (2006) viewed the concept with a broader outlook and contends that, corporate 
governance refers to the tool of the processes, structures and information used for directing and supervising 
the management of a corporation.  Equally, Uwuigbes, Uwuigbe, and Bernard (2015) viewed corporate 
governance as a concern that balanced economic, social, and communal goals. To attain this, there is a need to 
encourage efficient use of resources, accountability and alignment of the interest of various stakeholders, such 
as individuals, enterprise and the society (Azubike, 2014).  
Consequently, it can be deduced that corporate governance is a system by which companies are managed 
and controlled in order to prevent opportunistic behaviour of corporate malpractices. However, the board 
attributes are very crucial to the survival of every company, be it public or private sector. This implies that, 
there must be transparency and accountability in a board for them to fulfil their responsibilities to 
shareholders, creditors, government agencies, employees and community among others. 
Board attribute is one of the major corporate governance mechanism that explains earning management 
practice. From the empirical perspective in the literatures, evidence does not offer consistent findings in prior 
studies of board attributes and earnings management. Some stream of studies show that negative relationship 
exist between board attributes and earnings management (Abdul-Manaf, Amran, & Ishak, 2015; Bala & Kumai, 
2015; Guo & Ma, 2015). In like manner, Talbi, Omri, Guesmi, and Ftiti (2015) discover that board attributes 
have a negative association with the level of earnings management. Likewise, Uwuigbe et al. (2014) shows that 
board structure has significant adverse effect on earnings management.  
However studies provide evidences that a positive association exist between board attributes and earnings 
management (Cella, Ellul, & Gupta, 2014; Gulzar & Wang, 2011; Ogbodo, 2015; Ramadan, 2016). In addition, 
Hassan and Ibrahim (2014) reported that board structure is related to real earnings management. Similarly, 
Ali and Zhang (2015) indicate that board structure has a positive effect on earnings management. Ogbodo 
(2015) discovers a positive association between board attributes and earnings management practices in listed 
firms. Moreover, Chandren, Ahmad, and Ali (2015) indicates a positive correlation between board attributes 
and earnings management. 
Equally important, there are prior studies that investigated the relationship between board attributes 
(board size, board expert, board meeting among others) and earnings management. However, recent studies 
have recommended board size, board expertise, board meeting frequency and female directors as the most 
relevant board attributes to earnings management. From the foregoing literature, it can be argued that, there 
is a relationship between board attributes and earnings management. Therefore, this study seeks to examine 
the relationship between board attributes and real earnings management. Therefore, the next section reviews 
relationship between board size, board expertise, board meeting frequency, female director and earning 
management (as a dependent variable).  
 
2.1. Relationship between Board Size and Earnings Management 
Empirically, Studies that examine the relationship between board size and earnings management have 
shown that, there is contradicting result. For instance, Amran, Ishak, and Manaf (2016), Iraya, Mwangi, and 
Muchoki (2015) established that earnings management is negatively related to board size, and the more the 
number of directors on the board the lower the earnings manipulation. However, Hashemi and Rabiee (2011) 
reveal that small boards seem to be more likely to failure in detecting earnings management. An interpretation 
of this statement is that, smaller boards are less likely to monitor corporate managers while larger boards are 
more capable of monitoring the action of corporate managers.  
In contrast, other previous studies have reported positive correlation between board size and earnings 
management. For example, González and García-Meca (2014) investigated the influence of corporate 
governance on earnings management. The result of the study shows a positive correlation between board size 
and earnings management. Equally, Abdul and Haneem (2006) examine the effect of board size on earnings 
management, and claimed that size of the board is positively associated with earnings management activities. 
Also, Chandren et al. (2015) investigated the relationship between board size and accretive share buyback to 
meet or just beat earnings per share forecast. Their findings identified that board size is positively associated 
with earnings management practices. Therefore, based on the mixed findings and inconsistency of results as 
per highlighted above, this study proposed the following hypothesis; 
H1: There is negative relationship between board size and real earning management in Nigerian financial institutions.  
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2.2. Relationship between Board Meeting Frequency and Earnings Management 
The empirical result of the relationship between board meeting frequency and earnings management is 
ambiguous. Bala and Kumai (2015) examine board structure and earnings management of listed food and 
beverages firms in Nigeria, the result reveals that there is a significant negative relationship between board 
meeting frequency and earnings management. Again, González and García-Meca (2014) investigated the 
relationship between board meeting frequency and earnings management, the finding reveal that there is a 
significant negative correlation between board meeting frequency and earnings management. Other studies 
that found a negative association between board meeting frequency and earnings management (Ahmed, 2013; 
Zgarni et al., 2014).  
Nevertheless, Gulzar and Wang (2011) investigate the effect of corporate governance attributes in 
decreasing earnings management practices among listed companies. The finding reveals that there is a 
significant positive relationship between the frequency of board meeting and earnings management. Equally, 
Chandren et al. (2015) found board meeting frequency has an insignificant positive association with earnings 
management. Therefore, based on the mixed findings and inconsistency in the results of the studies review 
above, this study proposed the following hypothesis; 
H2: There is negative relationship between board meeting frequency and earning management in Nigerian financial 
institutions. 
 
2.3. Relationship between Board Member Expertise and Earnings Management 
Previous studies report mixed results on the relationship between board member expertise and earnings 
management. There is an inverse association between board financial expertise and earnings management, 
(Alzoubi & Selamat, 2012; Siam, Laili, & Khairi, 2014). As it mitigates earnings management practices in listed 
firms. Similarly, Liu and Tsai (2015) reveal the effect of board member characteristics on earnings 
management activities. The result documents that there is a significant negative relation between board 
member expertise and real earnings management. Hence, the board member expertise constrains real earnings 
management. 
Conversely, Ahmed (2013) examines the effect of the board of directors’ characteristics and earnings 
management. The result reveals that there is a positive relationship between board member expertise and 
earnings management. Therefore, based on the mixed finding and inconsistency results review above, this 
study proposed the following hypothesis: 
H3: There is negative relationship between board expertise and earning management in Nigerian financial institutions. 
 
2.4. Relationship between Female Director and Earnings Management 
With regards to the role of female director on mitigating earnings management, studies like Gulzar and 
Wang (2011) examines the relationship between women directors and earnings management among the listed 
companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China. The study reveals a significantly negative 
correlation between women directors and earnings management activities. Ku Ismail and Abdullah (2013) 
assess whether the representation of female directors on the board is related to earnings management practice 
in Bursa, Malaysian listed firms. The finding reveals a negative association between female directors and 
earnings management activities. Likewise, Omoye and Eriki (2014) consider the effect of female directors on 
the board with earnings management practices of listed firms in Nigeria. The result of the study reveals that 
there is a negative association between female directors on the board and practices of earnings management. 
Thus, corporate female directors on the board are less likely to involve in activities of earnings management. 
Conversely, Arun, Almahrog, and Aribi (2015) explore the relationship between women directors on the 
board and earnings management practices in United Kingdom companies. The study found a positive 
correlation between women directors and earnings management practices. Also, Bala and Kumai (2015) 
analysed the effect of female directors on activities of earnings management of listed food and beverage 
industry in Nigeria. The result signifies that, there is a significantly positive association between female 
directors and earnings management activities. Lakhal, Aguir, Lakhal, and Malek (2015) assess the effect of 
women directors on earnings management practice on the board of companies in France. The result shows 
that there is a significantly positive relationship between women directors and earnings management. 
Damagum, Oba, Chima, and Ibikunle (2014) examine the effect of women directors in corporate board and 
earnings management of non-financial listed firms in Nigerian Stock Exchange. The result establishes that, 
there is a positive relationship between women directors and earnings management activities. Also, Hassan 
and Ibrahim (2014) assesses the impact of women directors on the company’s ability to practice of earnings 
management. The result establishes that there is a positive association between women directors and earnings 
management. Therefore, based on the mixed findings and inconsistency in results, this study proposed the 
following hypothesis; 
H4: There is a negative relationship between female director and earnings management in Nigerian financial 
institutions. 
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3. Methodology 
The study focuses on board attributes (board size, board meeting, board expertise, female director) and 
real earnings management. The population of this study comprises of the 55 listed financial companies trading 
in the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) as at 31st December, 2016. Data for this study are collected from the 
annual accounts and report of forty five (45) selected companies whose data are available during the period 
under review (2011-2016) making a total of 270 firm-years observations. For analysis purpose, descriptive 
statistics, correlation analysis, and multivariate regression are employed through the use of STATA version 
14. 
 
3.1. Model Specification 
The model is specified on an empirical frame work using board attributes mentioned for this study is to 
examine the effect of board attributes on real earnings management. The dependent variable for this study is 
real earnings management posited to be function of board attributes such as board size, board meeting, board 
member expertise, female directors and independent directors on board. Having these variables, the equation 
presented as follows. 
REMit = β0 + β1BSIZit + β2BMTGit + β3BEXPit + β4FDIRit + β5FGRTit + β6PROFit + β7FLEVit + β8FAGEit 
+ Ɛit. 
 
Table-1. Description of the research variables. 
Variables Description Source 
Real Earnings 
Management (REM) 
Abnormal operating cash flow (Actual 
CFO – Estimate CFO) + abnormal cost of 
goods sold (Actual COGS – Estimated 
COGS)+ abnormal discretionary expense 
(Actual DC – Estimated DC). 
Roychowdhury (2006); Zgarni et al. 
(2014). 
Board Size (BSIZ) Number of directors on the board Amran et al. (2016); Chandren et al. 
(2015). 
Board Meeting 
Frequency (BMTG) 
Number of meetings held by the board of 
directors 
Chandren et al. (2015); Jia and Tang 
(2016). 
Board Member 
Expertise (BEXP) 
Number of directors with accounting and 
finance qualification 
Ahmed (2013); Bala and Kumai 
(2015).  
 
Female Director (FDIR) Proportion of female directors on the 
board 
Ishak, Amran, and Manaf (2017). 
Firm Growth (FGRT) Change in total assets (current year minus 
proceeding year) 
Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo 
(2014). 
Profitability (PROF) Ratio of profit after tax to a total asset of 
the company  
Nikoomaram, Banimahd, and Shokri 
(2012). 
Firm Leverage (FLEV)  Ratio of total debt to a total asset of the 
company 
 Benkel, Mather, and Ramsay 
(2006). 
Firm Age (FAGE) Number of years a company is in business 
since incorporated 
Bassiouny, Soliman, and Ragab 
(2016). 
Source: Extracted from previous literature.  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
The analysis starts with summary of the descriptive statistics on dependent variable and independent 
variables with mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum as presented in Table 2. 
 
Table-2. Summary of the Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
REM 270 3.1726 0.4871 1.4497 4.1407 
BSIZ 270 10.7222 3.4781 5.0000 20.0000 
BMTG 270 5.3519 1.9621 1.0000 13.0000 
BEXP 270 5.1593 4.1934 0.0000 18.0000 
FDIR 270 0.1486 0.1143 0.0000 0.5000 
FGRT 270 16.2834 0.1973 13.8155 17.2365 
FLEV 270 0.6491 0.6748 0.0012 8.9760 
PROF 270 0.3034 0.2754 -0.9242 4.1669 
FAGE 270 34.1500 13.5832 15.0000 70.0000 
Source: Generated from the analysis. 
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From Table 2, the average real earnings management of Nigerian financial institutions is 3.1726. This 
implies that on the average the institutions manage real earnings management upward. The maximum value 
of real earnings management is 4.1407 and minimum value of 1.4497. Moreover, the average board size is 11 
with the minimum of 5 and a maximum of 20 members on the board. The result indicates that Nigerian 
financial institutions have meet minimum requirement of 5 members of board size as stated by Nigerian Code 
of Corporate Governance. For the board meeting, the average board meeting is 5 with maximum of 13 and a 
minimum of 1 at the end of the financial year. The board expertise mean is 5 with a minimum number of 0 and 
a maximum number of 18. Female directors’ result shows an average of 15% female directors on a board, 
follows by the minimum of 0% and maximum of 50%. The result indicates that there is a presence of female 
directors on the board of directors of the sampled firms.  
The mean value of firm growth and profitability of Nigerian financial institutions are 16.2834 and 0.3034 
with a minimum (13.8155 and -0.9242) and a maximum (17.2365 and 0.4.1669) respectively. In addition, the 
standard deviation of firm growth is far away from the respective mean, whereas the standard deviation of 
profitability is not far away from the average. The firm leverage result of 0.6491 for the minimum value of 
0.0012 and a maximum value of 8.9760. Finally, the firm age measured by number of years an institution is in 
business since incorporated has shown the following descriptive statistics; the average age is about 34 years 
with a minimum of 15 years and a maximum of 70 years. 
 
Table-3. Pearson Correlation Result. 
 REM BSIZ BMTG BEXP FDIR FGRT FLEV PRF FAGE 
REM 1         
BSIZ 0.1463** 1        
BMTG 0.1121* 0.3199*** 1       
BEXP 0.1758*** 0.6527*** 0.2769*** 1      
FDIR -0.0866 0.0895 0.0085 0.0392 1     
FGRT 0.0241 0.0519 -0.0570 -0.0014 0.0412 1    
FLEV -0.1364** 0.2011*** 0.1667*** 0.2045*** 0.0542 0.0217 1   
PROF 
0.0500 -0.0165 -0.0058 0.0105 0.0294 0.0484 -
0.0315 
1  
FAGE 
0.1304** -0.0712 0.0052 0.1312** 0.1116* 0.0631 -
0.0817 
-
0.0572 
1 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed); * Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (1-
tailed). 
 
The result presented in Table 3 confirms that board expertise has a positive correlation with real earnings 
management at 1%. Likewise, board size and firm age are found to have a positive association with real 
earning management at 5% significant level. In addition, board meeting is a positive associated with real 
earnings management at 10%. Whereas, firm leverage have a negative relationship with real earnings 
management at 5%. Therefore, this means that an increase in board size, board meeting, board expertise and 
firm age will result to an increase in real earnings management. On the other hand, an increase in firm 
leverage will leads to a decrease in real earnings management. 
In addition, analysis of the result from the correlation as represented in Table 3 demonstrate that a 
positive relationship exist between board meeting, board expertise, firm leverage and board size at 1% 
significant level. Board meeting is found to have a significant positive relationship with board expertise and 
firm leverage at 1% significant level. Furthermore, board expertise have a significant positive association with 
firm leverage at 1% significant level. Similarly, the relationship between board expertise and firm age is 
significantly positive at 5%. Also, female director is positively correlated with firm age at the significant level 
of 10%. This indicates that as the proportion of female directors on the board increases lead to an increase of 
firm age. Therefore, this mean that an increase of female director will result to an increase in firm age on the 
board.  
After running the following diagnostic tests such as multicollinearity test, heteroscedasticity, Ramsey 
RESET test, Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data. Due to the existence of autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity, the Panel-corrected Standard Error (PCSE) regression is utilised (Wooldridge, 2010) and 
presented in Table 4. 
This study found that there is no relationship between board size and real earnings management with 
coefficient of 0.0005 as depicted in Table 4. The result rejects the first hypothesis in this study which states 
that there is negative relationship between board size and real earnings management. In addition, the outcome 
shows that there is a significant positive relationship between board meeting and real earnings management 
(β=-0.207, p<0.1). This discovery implies that the more board meetings there is, the higher the level of real 
earnings management practices. This result is consistent with the findings of some previous studies (for 
instance, (Chandren et al., 2015; Gulzar & Wang, 2011) where they opined that the frequency of higher board 
meetings provides ineffective monitoring of management behaviour on a board. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
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which states that there is a negative relationship between board meeting and earnings management of the 
sampled financial institutions in Nigeria is rejected. 
 
Table-4. Panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs) Pooled OLS. 
Variables Coef. Std Error Z P>Z 
BSIZ 0.0005 0.0004 1.11 0.134 
BMTG 0.0207 0.0138 1.51 0.066* 
BEXP 0.0142 0.0078 1.82 0.034** 
FDIR -0.4577 0.2524 -1.81 0.035** 
FGRT 0.0620 0.0771 0.81 0.211 
FLEV -0.1276 0.0793 -1.61 0.054** 
PROF 0.0953 0.0689 1.38 0.084* 
FAGE 0.0042 0.0013 3.18 0.000*** 
_cons -0.7311 1.2433 1.55 0.061 
N 45 
No. of Obs. 270 
R2 0.1940 
Wald Chi2 49.85*** 
Prob>F 0.0000 
Heteroscedasticity Test 0.7856 
Multicollinearity Test (mean) 1.28 
Wooldridge Test 0.0335 
Pesaran’s Test 0.385 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, *p < .10. 
 
In addition, the findings of this study shows that board expertise has significant positive relationship with 
real earnings management (β=0.0142, p<0.05). This reveals that if board expertise increases by 1 unit, real 
earnings management will increases by 0.0142. This result basically indicates that the higher the number of 
board expertise the more possible corporate managers are involved in practice of earnings management. The 
findings of the study is not in conformity with third hypothesis, hence, it is therefore not supported. 
Furthermore, the regression result from Table 4 portrays that female director (FDIR) has negative and 
significant influence (β= -0.4577, p<0.05) on the real earnings management of listed financial institutions in 
Nigeria. This findings is consistent with Arun et al. (2015) study in which they found a link between earnings 
management and presence of woman directors on the board. Interestingly, Gul, Fung, and Jaggi (2009) argued 
that female directors demonstrate good ethical behaviour in which they obtain voluntary information which 
may lead to a decrease in information asymmetry, as a result of their adequate knowledge possessed by female 
directors on real earnings management in Nigerian financial institutions. The outcome supports hypothesis 4 
of the study.  Which stipulates that there is ethical value differences between male and female directors on the 
board. 
A number of firm- specific control variables included in the study are based on the existing literature 
(Amran et al., 2016; Chandren et al., 2015; Kyaw, Olugbode, & Petracci, 2015). Specifically, firm growth shows 
that there is no relationship with real earnings management at a coefficient of 0.0620. In addition, the result of 
firm leverage confirms that there is a negative association with real earnings management at 5% significant 
level. However, Table 4 depicts that there is a positive coefficient of 0.0953 for the profitability result with z-
value of 1.38 at the 10% significant level, the result describe the link direction. The outcome in respect of firm 
age and real earnings management shows that firm age is significantly associated at 1% in explaining real 
earnings management with coefficient of 0.0042. The result implies that younger firms are less prone to 
commit real earnings management than older firms. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The study examines the link between board attributes and earnings management of listed firms in 
Nigeria. The study provides empirical evidence of board attributes in explaining and predicting real earnings 
management of the Nigerian listed financial institutions. Thus, the study concludes that female directors play 
a significant role in mitigating the activities of real earnings management. On the other hand, board expertise 
and board meeting trigger the problems associated with the real earnings management of the financial 
institutions in Nigeria, which affect the quality of earnings adversely.  It is therefore recommended that 
regulatory agencies of government (Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Securities and Exchange Commission 
[SEC], Corporate Affairs Commission [CAC], and National Insurances Commission [NAICOM]) in the 
Nigerian financial sector should make the recent technique of real earnings management known to board 
members in developed economies in order to play role in constraining corporate managers to act 
opportunistically in the ordinary course of business activities and preparing financial reports. 
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Logically, this implies that, there is need for comprehensive research studies on other corporate 
governance variables (for example, CEO tenure, CEO education level, CEO duality) and real earnings 
management, particularly in the Nigerian financial institutions. Thus, Nigerian financial institutions face 
problems with real earnings manipulation by board members for private benefits. Since it has become apparent 
that there is limited research in the area of real earnings management and board attributes. More so, it will be 
interesting for future researchers to look into this promising area of research which otherwise can empirically 
provide evidence of moderating variable on the established relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and real earnings management. 
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